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Abstract 
The main characteristics of cloud computing services are explained and the clauses typically included in contracts between 
suppliers and customers of such services are discussed. Storing data on a cloud service can be more comfortable for an 
organization and cheaper than local storage, but it involves several risks. Recommendations are given on how to negotiate 
contracts. A list of questions to be asked of cloud service suppliers is provided so that a potential client can take an informed 
decision and avoid unpleasant surprises.
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Título: Legislación sobre computación en la nube y negociación de contratos
Resumen
Se explican las características de los servicios de computación en la nube y se discuten las cláusulas que suelen incluir los 
contratos entre proveedores de dichos servicios y clientes. Mantener los datos en un servicio en la nube puede ser cómodo 
y más barato que en una instalación local de la propia organización, pero comporta varios riesgos. Se dan recomendaciones 
sobre cómo negociar los contratos, y se ofrece una lista de preguntas para obtener información del proveedor y así poder 
tomar una decisión bien informada que evite posteriores desagradables sorpresas.
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ARTÍCULOS
Introduction
A cloud computing service is one that provides computing 
power without the installation of content, hardware or soft-
ware application at the client or customer’s premises. 
Wikipedia defines cloud computing as follows:
“Cloud computing provides computation, software, data 
access, and storage services that do not require end-user 
knowledge of the physical location and configuration of 
the system that delivers the services. 
Cloud computing describes a new consumption, and de-
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livery model for IT services based on internet protocols, 
and it typically involves provisioning of dynamically scal-
able and often virtualized resources. It is a byproduct and 
consequence of the ease-of-access to remote computing 
sites provided by the internet. This may take the form of 
web-based tools or applications that users can access and 
use through a web browser as if the programs were in-
stalled locally on their own computers. 
Cloud computing providers deliver applications via the 
internet, which are accessed from a web browser, while 
the business software and data are stored on servers at 
a remote location. In some cases, legacy applications are 
delivered via a screen-sharing technology, while the com-
puting resources are consolidated at a remote data center 
location; in other cases, entire business applications have 
been coded.
Most cloud computing infrastructures consist of services 
delivered through shared data-centers and appearing as 
a single point of access for consumers’ computing needs. 
Commercial offerings may be required to meet service-
level agreements (SLAs), but specific terms are less often 
negotiated by smaller companies.”
Services such as Facebook, Rackspace, Hotmail, Twitter, 
Yahoo!, YouTube, Flickr, eBay, Google Apps (and all its sub-
sidiary offerings such as Gmail and Google Drive), Amazon 
EC2, TripAdvisor and DropBox either employ or offer cloud 
services. 
Interest in the use of cloud services is growing and is very 
understandable. Cloud services offer a cheap and efficient 
method of outsourcing computerised handling of all types 
of data to organisations that find such tasks burdensome, 
expensive or beyond their technical capabilities.
Cloud services and their contracts
Clients of cloud services providers (CSPs) sign up to a con-
tract. The contracts that most cloud services offer are in 
general non-negotiable. It’s a case of take it or leave it. Only 
very large or prestigious organisations will have the neces-
sary influence to require a CSP to accept amendments to its 
standard terms and conditions. There have been a number 
of surveys carried out of cloud service contracts; these have 
demonstrated that many of the standard contracts are ex-
tremely one-sided in favour of the cloud supplier. A typical 
one-sided example comes from Apple’s iCloud service:
“You acknowledge and agree that Apple may, without li-
ability to you, access, use, preserve and/or disclose your 
Account information and Content to law enforcement 
authorities, government officials, and/or a third party, as 
Apple believes is reasonably necessary or appropriate, if 
legally required to do so or if we have a good faith belief 
that such access, use, disclosure, or preservation is rea-
sonably necessary to: (a) comply with legal process or re-
quest; (b) enforce this Agreement, including investigation 
of any potential violation thereof; (c) detect, prevent or 
otherwise address security, fraud or technical issues; or 
(d) protect the rights, property or safety of Apple, its us-
ers, a third party, or the public as required or permitted 
by law.”
If an individual or small organisation doesn’t like the stan-
dard terms offered, it has to make a decision whether to risk 
accepting the standard contract, try another cloud supplier, 
or give up on cloud services altogether. 
Very few cloud service contracts offer guarantees of good 
service (e.g., 100% uptime), and those that offer refunds for 
poor service availability typically offer such refunds in terms 
of money off a future renewal of the subscription rather 
than a refund of the existing subscription. So if the client is 
so annoyed by poor availability it decides to not renew, or to 
cancel its current contract, it will get no refund for the prob-
lems encountered. Some contracts give the service supplier 
the right to close the service at little or no notice. Presum-
ably it would only do this if the service was unprofitable or 
if the cloud service supplier itself was in serious financial 
difficulty, but the danger is that the client who depends on 
the service for its day-to-day business activities may be left 
suddenly in great difficulty. 
Overall, the contracts tend to put what few obligations there 
are on the clients rather than on the service supplier. Few 
offer automatic encryption of data given to them and/or an-
onymisation of personal data. In recent years, the concept 
of a privacy impact assessment (PIA), i.e., an independent 
assessment of the risks to privacy of a particular service or 
system, together with advice on how to tighten things up if 
necessary, has become popular. Few of the cloud contracts 
include references to PIAs. They also do not give clients the 
ability to check privacy compliance. 
Many cloud service suppliers include a clause by which they 
exclude all liability for any problems that arise in the ser-
vice, whether or not it was caused by the service supplier’s 
incompetence or recklessness. The legality of such clauses 
is unclear, especially when imposed on an individual. It is re-
ally disappointing that cloud service suppliers include such 
clauses, which indicate an immaturity of, and lack of confi-
dence in, the cloud service supply industry.
Some service suppliers’ clauses exclu-
ding liability indicate an immaturity of, 
and lack of confidence in, their industry
Most business users of cloud services will no doubt have 
some form of notice and take down policy and procedures 
on their Web sites, explaining how any third party can 
complain about content on its Web site (e.g., it infringes 
copyright or is defamatory). What if a cloud service sup-
plier maintains that Web site? The service contract should 
address the question of how rapidly the cloud supplier can 
take down offending materials if the client asks it to, but 
most cloud contracts do not address this issue. 
A CSP will no doubt wish to monitor use to assess bandwidth 
and hardware use, for statistical analyses, business planning 
etc., and indeed some of these statistics could be useful for 
the client as well. The potential cloud service client should 
examine the contract terms carefully to ensure that they 
clearly explain the monitoring carried out, and that it is con-
tent with whatever monitoring occurs.
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The contract should also outline the procedures with re-
spect to deletion of data if and when the contract with the 
CSP ends. The client will want to know whether the cloud 
provider will delete their data on termination. It is likely that 
the client will want all copies of data in the possession of 
the cloud provider deleted after it has exercised its rights 
to have data returned. And, of course, it will want to ensure 
that the data is returned in a format that is appropriate for 
any future use made of that data.
Data protection and security issues in the cloud
Almost by definition, data stored in the cloud will move from 
country to country, each with its own laws. In addition, the 
CSP may well be based in a different country to that of its cli-
ents. The situation becomes particularly problematic when 
considering the legality of the contract, such as the differ-
ing requirements for “fairness” in different countries. There 
are potentially at least four countries’ laws to consider in 
the case of personal data stored in the cloud – the home 
base of the service supplier, the home base of the client, the 
country in which an individual whose information is stored 
is based, and the country where the cloud happens to be 
residing at any given time. Questions then arise regarding 
liability should, say, personal data leak out in some unautho-
rised way. Even if there is no personal data present, three 
countries’ laws (the home base of the service supplier, the 
home base of the client and the country where the cloud 
happens to be residing at any given time) may apply to any 
actions taken with the data or any legal cases arising from 
the contract. 
Data Protection legislation result from the CSP’s own fail-
ings. In addition, many Data Protection Acts provide an of-
ficial regulator with the powers to impose notices requiring 
the data owner to do something, or to supply certain in-
formation. The contract must ensure that the cloud service 
responds rapidly to either requirement.
Many countries’ data protection legislation make it illegal to 
transfer personal data to a country without adequate data 
protection laws unless the transfer is necessary for a con-
tract, has the explicit approval of the individual, or for a few 
other restricted reasons. Most CSPs are US-based, though 
some have EU-based subsidiaries. Those that are US-based 
often commit to Safe Harbour Principles, i.e., that data in 
their care will be placed in a physical environment where EU 
data protection laws are followed. However, not all commit 
to this, and it would be a very strange cloud service that 
committed to never letting data under its control outside 
the European Economic Area. Those that do not commit to 
a Safe Harbour are therefore particularly high risk from a cli-
ent’s point of view, as the data may well be held in a country 
with little or no regard for data protection laws. Rather wor-
ryingly, some of the biggest CSPs do not commit in their con-
tracts either to follow EU data protection laws, or to place 
client data in a safe harbour. Furthermore, the contracts do 
not oblige the CSP to inform a client if a search warrant has 
been issued to inspect the data it holds.
Even if the CSP promises to maintain the data it is entrusted 
with in a safe harbour, how can one be sure the data will 
always stay in a safe harbour when the entire business ra-
tionale for cloud is to place the data in whatever is the eco-
nomically most advantageous place? The data will be kept 
in whatever data centre is available, and may only stay there 
a short time before being moved on to another data centre. 
One approach to this potential problem is to get the CSP to 
agree to use a safe harbour combined with a “if anything 
goes wrong you will be subject to the rules of the EU data 
protection law” contractual obligation. Then, if anything did 
go wrong, the supplier would be penalised as if they were 
operating within the EU. But, as noted above, CSPs are no-
toriously unwilling to negotiate on contractual terms. None-
theless, it is strongly recommended that a potential client 
demand that basic safe harbour principles be applied.
Patriot act
One particular area of concern is the Uniting and strength-
ening America by providing appropriate tools required to in-
tercept and obstruct terrorism, better known as the Patriot 
act. This wide-ranging piece of legislation allows US authori-
ties to compel, amongst others, internet service providers 
(ISPs) and cloud service providers to disclose information 
about their customers and/or the data stored or used by 
those customers, and without those customers knowing 
that such information has been requested. Despite the Act’s 
title, its use can extend beyond terrorism to many other 
types of criminal investigation. Because of its wide-rang-
ing powers, this Act has been viewed with distaste by those 
countries with well developed data protection legislation 
in place, and has led to some governments (e.g., Canada 
and Netherlands) banning organisations under their con-
Data provided to a cloud service su-
pplier can move from country to coun-
try without the client knowing when or 
where
Numerous surveys of users, and potential users of cloud 
services have demonstrated concerns about the security of 
data, e.g., hacking, as well as data protection/privacy con-
cerns as potential inhibitors to the use of cloud services. 
The key risks are seen as the exposure of confidential and 
personal information to governments, competitors, thieves 
or opportunists.
The cloud’s ubiquitous and dynamic nature means that data 
provided to a cloud service supplier will move from country 
to country without the client knowing when or where the 
data is being moved. Furthermore, the data might well be 
backed up or replicated in multiple countries. Indeed, it is 
possible that more than one CSP will co-operate and trans-
fer data between their servers. However, data protection 
(and other) laws vary greatly from country to country, with 
some countries offering no realistic protection at all in their 
legislation. Ideally, then, the contract between the CSP and 
the client should cover questions of who is responsible for 
ensuring that personal data is kept safe. Furthermore, the 
contract should include provision for the CSP to pay com-
pensation to individuals, or any fine should a breach of any 
Charles Oppenheim
456     El profesional de la información, 2012, septiembre-octubre, v. 21, n. 5. ISSN: 1386-6710
trol from passing any data to US-based organisations, and 
has allegedly led to Amazon delaying the launch of its new 
Kindle Fire within the EU because of the incompatibility of 
the Patriot act with EU data protection legislation. 
The key issue for a cloud service client, therefore, is not just 
whether the cloud service offers a safe harbour for its infor-
mation, but also whether it wishes to take the risk that its 
data might end up in the hands of US authorities as a result 
of a Patriot act action. An informed judgement should be 
made, and I recommend great caution be exercised if the 
data is particularly sensitive, either in terms of personal 
data, or in terms of commercially confidential data. It is one 
of many risk factors one should take into account when en-
gaging a cloud service supplier. The Patriot act is not alone of 
course; there are similar pieces of legislation in other coun-
tries where cloud data might be held, but they are generally 
not as far-reaching or as well known as the Patriot act.
Security
Security issues are also a major concern. There have been 
anecdotal reports of instances when one cloud service client 
was able to read another cloud service client’s materials for 
short periods of time. A prospective client of a cloud service 
therefore should undertake appropriate due diligence about 
the cloud service it is thinking of using to assure themselves 
that security is at a level appropriate to the value and/or 
sensitivity of the information which may be passed to that 
cloud service. It is also a good idea to test the cloud service 
first with non-sensitive information. I recommend that the 
contract with the CSP be negotiated if possible to include a 
clause obliging the service to comply with certain specified 
international security standards, and/or with the client’s 
own security standards. The contract should make explicit 
the service provider’s liability (and limits of liability) in case 
of data loss or a security breach. Clients should resist any 
contract that absolves the cloud service from any liability for 
data loss or security breach.
Other legal issues
Data protection and security of data are not the only legal 
issues that can arise. Questions might arise regarding who 
is responsible if the data offered by a client are somehow 
amended or released resulting in an illegality, such as def-
amation or breaking national security laws. It is not clear 
what country’s laws might apply in such cases. Whilst it is 
unrealistic to expect the CSP to monitor everything on its 
servers (and indeed, this could be problematic from a pri-
vacy point of view), it is reasonable to expect it to respond 
to complaints received regarding alleged defamatory com-
ments. The contract or a Service Level Agreement between 
the client and the CSP will probably include warranties and 
instructions relating to alleged defamatory statements or 
other potentially illegal materials stored on the cloud’s 
servers.
Software licences, copyright licences and database rights 
licences are also –and somewhat surprisingly- potentially 
problematic. If a client has permission to use a particular 
software or database “on site”, does that include “in the 
cloud”? A licence might state that the material must not be 
sent to another country. Such restrictions may even go fur-
ther, stating that a particular database or software may only 
be used on a single computer, or may only be used by em-
ployees of the licensee. If such databases and/or software 
are going to be placed in the cloud, these database or soft-
ware licences will have to be renegotiated. Many database 
and software licensors are aware of the cloud and are willing 
to be flexible on this matter. If they are not, then a decision 
has to be taken whether to place that database/software on 
the cloud, or to use an alternative database/software that 
imposes no such restrictions.
Finally, client service clients should ensure that the contract 
confirms that the ownership of copyright and other Intellec-
tual Property Rights in materials passed by the client at any 
time to the service remain with the original owners, and is 
not assigned to the cloud service.
Questions to ask a cloud service supplier before 
you sign up
I suggest below a list of questions that could be asked of any 
CSP before signing its contract:
– Who (both within and outside the service supplier) will be 
able to see my information?
– Who owns and controls your infrastructure? Is this out-
sourced to any third party?
– Where are the infrastructure elements located? (Then 
check what data protection laws apply in those countries; 
if the answer is “it is not known in what countries the data 
might be held”, it is best not to sign up to that cloud su-
pplier)
– Can I see a copy of your reliability/availability/downtime 
reports (if any)?
– What service levels are guaranteed, e.g., availability, time 
taken to resolve a problem, and what compensation do 
you offer if you fail to fulfil that? (In particular, would-be 
clients should resist the current standard practice of dis-
counts on future subscriptions, but insist where possible 
to receive financial compensation there and then and/or 
the right to terminate early with refunds)
– Have you ever had security breaches in the past? (If “yes”, 
ask for more details.)
– Do I have a contact name within your organisation in case 
of any problems?
– Will you abide by the local relevant Data Protection Act (if 
one applies) when you handle my information? Will you 
pay damages if a breach of the Act occurs which is your 
fault? What assurances can you give that data protection 
standards will be maintained even if the data we supply is 
stored in a country with weak, or no data protection laws, 
or where government inspection powers are very wide-
ranging?
– How easy would it be to migrate my data to a competitor 
service once this contract ends? Can you guarantee that it 
will be in a usable format?
– Who is responsible for ID management and access control 
in your company?
– What are the names of your employees responsible for 
handling our data?
Cloud law and contract negotiation
El profesional de la información, 2012, septiembre-octubre, v. 21, n. 5. ISSN: 1386-6710     457
– What security policies, technology and systems do you 
employ? What national or international standards do they 
comply with?
– Do I get any rights of refusal before you make changes 
to the service that affect my data? (Alternatively, can we 
cancel early and get money back if we cancel early becau-
se of unwanted service changes?)
– Will you use my organisation’s name or type of data given 
to you on any of your advertising? (If need be, require that 
the cloud supplier has to ask for permission each time)
– What special measures will you take regarding data we 
tag as confidential?
– Could we have a free trial with some non-sensitive data 
before committing ourselves?
– Are you willing to include clauses in the contract relating 
to ensuring there is no unauthorised loss or destruction of 
data?
– Can you provide us with routine backups of all our data 
stored on your cloud?
– Will you guarantee to inform us if you become aware 
of any data security breach that affects or involves our 
data?
– Finally, and most important, is your contract negotiable?
Some of these questions may well be answered in the draft 
contract, in documents published by the service or in infor-
mal discussions with cloud service sales executives. Some of 
the answers you should press to be included in the contract 
itself or in a Service Level Agreement, i.e., you should not 
allow yourself to be satisfied with informal assurances. The 
real issue in using cloud services is that you are entering into 
a relationship on standard terms and conditions, with little 
power to negotiate. You need faith in the provider to be 
comfortable with that position. The types of answers (or the 
refusal to provide answers) to the questions above should 
help justify (or not) that faith.
I would conclude that one should not get paranoid about 
the cloud. It offers many potential benefits. But one should 
enter into a cloud contract being aware of both the benefits 
and the risks and should make an informed risk assessment 
before committing you, or your employer, to a cloud ser-
vice.
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